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The Missouri Law Review’s title for this symposium rightly recognizes 
the distinction between judicial selection and judicial retention.1  We should 
distinguish the process that initially selects a judge from the process that de-
termines whether to retain that judge on the court.  Judicial selection and 
judicial retention raise different issues.2  In this paper, I primarily focus on 
selection.  I summarize the fifty states’ methods of supreme court selection 
and place them on a continuum from the most populist to the most elitist.3
 © Stephen J. Ware.  Thanks to Michael Dimino, Richard E. Levy and Caro-
line Bader. 
 1. The symposium title is “Mulling over the Missouri Plan: A Review of State 
Judicial Selection and Retention Systems.”
 2. While differing views about judicial independence are central to the debate 
over judicial retention, they are at most peripheral to the issues involved in judicial 
selection.  Stephen J. Ware, Selection to the Kansas Supreme Court, 17 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 386, 406-07 & n.83 (2008).  See also ALFRED P. CARLTON, JR., JUSTICE 
IN JEOPARDY: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON THE 21ST 
CENTURY JUDICIARY 72 (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/judind/jeop 
ardy/pdf/report.pdf (“Discussions of judicial selection often overlook a distinction 
that the Commission regards as absolutely critical, between initial selection and rese-
lection. . . . In the Commission’s view, the worst selection-related judicial indepen-
dence problems arise in the context of judicial reselection.”); Michael R. Dimino, Sr.,
Accountability Before the Fact, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 451, 460 
(2008) (“Initial selections – whether by election or appointment – present quite differ-
ent, and less substantial, hazards to judicial independence than do reelections and 
reappointments.”); id. at 453-54 (“[T]he threat to judicial independence in the thirty-
nine states that elect some of their judges comes primarily not from the system of 
initial judicial selection, but from the reelections that those judges are forced to con-
template and endure if they are to remain in office.”); Charles Gardner Geyh, The 
Endless Judicial Selection Debate and Why It Matters for Judicial Independence, 21 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1259, 1276 (2008) (“[T]he primary threat to independence 
arises at the point of re-selection, when judges are put at risk of losing their jobs for 
unpopular decisions that they previously made.”); David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judi-
cial Elections, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 265, 285 (2008) (“Prejudging judges may raise 
any number of problems, but it is the postjudging of them that systematically threat-
ens individual and minority rights and the rule of law.”); Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, 
Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 629 (2009) (“[U]nlike judges fac-
ing retention decisions, judges who do not need to appeal to voters shape their rulings 
to voters’ preferences less.  For example, voters’ politics has little effect on the rul-
ings of judges with permanent tenure or who plan to retire before the next election.”).
3. See Tbl.1 infra, at 775.  I am not the first to use the concepts of populism and 
elitism to describe debate over judicial selection.  See, e.g., Seth Andersen, Examining 
the Decline in Support for Merit Selection in the States, 67 ALB. L. REV. 793, 796-97 
(2004) (referring to a “populist retort” and “charges of elitism”); Paul D. Carrington, 
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Doing so reveals that the Missouri Plan is the most elitist (and least democrat-
ic) of the three common methods of selecting judges in the United States.  
After highlighting this troubling characteristic of the Missouri Plan’s process 
of selecting judges, I turn briefly to the retention of judges and caution 
against the dangers posed by subjecting sitting judges to elections, including 
the retention elections of the Missouri Plan.  I conclude with support for a 
system that, in initially selecting judges, avoids the undemocratic elitism of 
the Missouri Plan and, in retaining judges, avoids the dangers (populist and 
otherwise) of judicial elections. 
I.  SUPREME COURT SELECTION IN THE FIFTY STATES 
A.  Democratic Selection Methods 
While some states have individual quirks, three basic methods of su-
preme court selection prevail around the country: contestable elections, senate 
confirmation and the Missouri Plan.4  The most common method, used by 
twenty-two states, is the contestable election.5  Allowing two or more candi-
  
Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 106 (1998) (‘“Merit selection’ is seen by many as a 
masquerade to put political power in the hands of the organized bar and other mem-
bers of the elite.”); Julius Uehlein & David H. Wilderman, Opinion: Why Merit Selec-
tion Is Inconsistent with Democracy, 106 DICK. L. REV. 769 (2002) (“Organized labor 
views the merit selection (political appointment) process as a wonderful public rela-
tions gimmick for disguising a power shift from the people to an elite crew – a com-
pletely undemocratic process that empowers non-elected lawyers and others to select 
judges with little or no accountability to the people.”); Marie A. Failinger, Can a 
Good Judge Be a Good Politician? Judicial Elections from a Virtue Ethics Approach, 
70 MO. L. REV. 433, 439 (2005) (“[M]ost traditional opponents of judicial merit se-
lection . . . have argued that the process is elitist, secretive, unaccountable to and 
unreflective of the interests of citizens, and highly political.”); John Copeland Nagle, 
Choosing the Judges Who Choose the President, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 499, 512-13 
(2002) (“Merit selection systems are even worse from the perspective of accountabili-
ty – they are elitist.”); THE JUDICIAL SELECTION TASK FORCE OF THE ASS’N OF THE 
BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE SELECTION OF JUDGES AND 
THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN NEW YORK 35 (2003), available at 
http://www.abcny.org/pdf/Judicial%20selection%20task%20force.pdf (“A recurring 
criticism of merit selection is that it is elitist.”). 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 5, 10 & 34.  In two states, Virginia and 
South Carolina, supreme court justices are appointed by the legislature.  Ware, supra 
note 2, at 388 & n.9. 
 5. Ware, supra note 2, at 389 & n.13.  In some states, interim vacancies (that 
occur during a justice’s uncompleted term) are filled in a different manner from initial 
vacancies.  See AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, METHODS OF JUDICIAL SECTION, http://w 
ww.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/selection_of_judges.cfm?state= 
(last visited Apr. 20, 2009).  Several states that use elections to fill initial vacancies 
use nominating commissions to fill interim vacancies.  Id. 
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dates to run for a seat on the supreme court is the most populist of the three 
methods because it puts power directly in the hands of the people, the voters.6  
Importantly, members of the bar get no special powers.  “[A] lawyer’s vote is 
worth no more than any other citizen’s vote.”7   
The second common method of selecting state supreme court justices8 is 
the one used to select federal judges: executive nomination followed by se-
nate confirmation.9  In twelve states, the governor nominates state supreme 
court justices, but the governor’s nominee does not join the court unless con-
firmed by the state senate or similar popularly elected body.10   
Senate confirmation is a less populist method of judicial selection than 
contestable elections because senate confirmation is less directly dependent 
on the “wisdom . . . of the common people.”11  While contestable judicial 
elections “embody the passion for direct democracy prevalent in the Jackso-
nian era[,] . . . senate confirmation exemplifies the republicanism of our Na-
tion’s Founders.”12  Senate confirmation is part of the Founders’ “system of 
  
 6. A populist is “a believer in the rights, wisdom, or virtues of the common 
people.”  Merriam-Webster OnLine Dictionary: Populism, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/populism (last visited Apr. 16, 2009). 
 7. Ware, supra note 2, at 390. 
 8. The judges on some states’ highest courts are not called “justices,” and in 
some states the highest court is not called the “supreme court.”  Nevertheless, I use 
the common term “supreme court justices” to speak generally about high court judges 
and avoid terminology variations from state to state.   
 9. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 10. Ware, supra note 2, at 388, 389 & nn.11-12.  Confirmation is done by the 
state senate in Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Utah and 
Vermont; by the entire legislature in Connecticut and Rhode Island; and by the gover-
nor’s council in Massachusetts and New Hampshire.  A thirteenth state, California, 
can be added.  Its confirmation body is a three-person commission made up of the 
chief justice, attorney general and most senior presiding justice of the court of appeals 
in California.  Id.   
  The previous paragraph’s categorization of states is similar to that found in 
an article by Joshua C. Hall & Russell S. Sobel, Is the ‘Missouri Plan’ Good for Mis-
souri? The Economics of Judicial Selection, SHOW-ME INST. POL’Y STUDY NO. 15, 
May 21, 2008, at 10-11, http://showmeinstitute.org/docLib/20080515_smi_study_ 
15.pdf.  However, Hall and Sobel distinguish the “executive council[s]” used for 
confirmation in California, Massachusetts and New Hampshire from the legislatures 
used for confirmation in other states on the ground that those three councils are 
“usually governor-appointed.”  Id. at 11.  In fact, however, Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire elect their councils.  See MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 2, § 1, art. 9; id. amend. 
art. XVI; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, arts. 46, 60-61.  And California elects its attorney gener-
al.  CAL. CONST. art. 5, § 11. 
 11. Merriam-Webster OnLine Dictionary: Populism, supra note 6. 
 12. Ware, supra note 2, at 406.  On Nineteenth Century debates about contesta-
ble elections versus senate confirmation and legislative appointment of judges, see 
Caleb Nelson, A Re-Evaluation of Scholarly Explanations for the Rise of the Elective 
Judiciary in Antebellum America, 37 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 190 (1993); Kermit L. Hall, 
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indirect democracy in which the structure of government mediates and cools 
the momentary passions of popular majorities.”13   
Although not as populist as the direct democracy of contestable judicial 
elections, senate confirmation does make judicial selection indirectly        
accountable to the people because, at the federal level, the people elect their 
senators14 and, through the Electoral College, the President.15  Similarly, in 
states that use this method of judicial selection, the people elect their gover-
nors and state senators.   
In other words, senate confirmation is – like contestable elections – fun-
damentally democratic,16 although it is less populist than contestable elec-
tions.  Senate confirmation is democratic because it facilitates the “rule of the 
majority”17 by adhering to the principle of one-person-one-vote.  At the fed-
eral level, one-person-one-vote is tempered by federalism, as both the U.S. 
Senate and Electoral College give disproportionate weight to voters in low-
population states.18  But at the state level nothing similarly tempers the demo-
cratic nature of senate confirmation.  In those states in which the governor 
may appoint to the court whomever he or she wants,19 subject only to confir-
mation by a popularly elected body such as the state senate, judicial selection 
  
Progressive Reform and the Decline of Democratic Accountability: The Popular 
Election of State Supreme Court Judges, 1850-1920, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 345 
(1984); F. Andrew Hanssen, Learning About Judicial Independence: Institutional 
Change in the State Courts, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 431, 445-48 (2004); Roy A. Schot-
land, Myth, Reality Past and Present, and Judicial Elections, 35 IND. L. REV. 659, 
661-62 (2002).  
 13. Ware, supra note 2, at 406.  Prior to the direct election of senators, they were 
chosen by the state legislatures, U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1, so popular accountabili-
ty was even more indirect. 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.   
 15. U.S. CONST. art. 2, §1, cl. 2. 
 16. Democracy is “government by the people; especially: rule of the majority 
[; or] a government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and exercised 
by them directly or indirectly through a system of representation usually involving 
periodically held free elections.”  Merriam-Webster OnLine Dictionary: Democracy, 
§ 1.a.-b., http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/democracy (last visited Apr. 
16, 2009) (emphasis added).  As Professor Jeffrey Jackson puts it, 
Judicial elections, for all of their problems, fit well within the democratic 
system, in that judges are selected through a direct vote of the public.  
Even appointments, such as those in the federal system, have a basis in the 
democratic process, in that the appointments are made by a popularly-
elected official holding a national or state-wide office, with the choice 
then confirmed by a popularly-elected representative body.  
Jeffrey D. Jackson, Beyond Quality: First Principles in Judicial Selection and Their 
Application to a Commission-Based Selection System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 125, 
146 (2007). 
 17. Merriam-Webster OnLine Dictionary: Democracy, supra note 16, at § 1.a. 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1 (Senate); id. art. 2, § 1, cl. 2 (Electoral College). 
 19. See infra note 32. 
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is laudably democratic because governors and state senators are elected under 
the principle of one-person-one-vote.  In these elections, members of the bar 
get no special powers.  Again, a lawyer’s vote is worth no more than any 
other citizen’s vote. 
B.  Departures from Democracy:  
Varying Levels of Elitism in Judicial Selection 
Some senate-confirmation states, however, have supreme court selection 
processes that do give special powers to members of the bar.  As the bar is an 
elite segment of society,20 states that give lawyers more power than their fel-
low citizens are rightly described as elitist.  Indeed the rationale for giving 
lawyers special powers over judicial selection – lawyers are better than their 
fellow citizens at identifying who will be a good judge21 – is openly elitist.22  
A mixture of this elitism (special powers for lawyers) and democracy (senate 
confirmation of gubernatorial nominees) characterizes the states discussed in 
the following four paragraphs. 
While the President may nominate anyone to the U.S. Supreme Court, in 
some senate-confirmation states the governor is restricted in whom he or she 
may nominate to the state supreme court.  For example, New York restricts 
whom the governor may nominate to its highest court, the court of appeals.23  
  
 20. Among the dictionary definitions of “elite” is “a group of persons who by 
virtue of position or education exercise much power or influence.”  Merriam-Webster 
OnLine Dictionary: Elite, § 1.d., http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/elite 
(last visited Apr. 16, 2009).  In the United States, of course, lawyers tend to have 
above-average levels of education and income.  According to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, the average lawyer in the United States earns $118,280, while the average 
person earns $40,690.  Bureau of Labor Statistics, Occupational Employment Statis-
tics, May 2007 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, United 
States, http://www.bls.gov/oes/2007/may/oes_nat.htm#b00-0000 (last visited Apr. 16, 
2009).  Nearly all lawyers have a post-graduate degree, while only 10% of Americans 
do.  SARAH R. CRISSEY, EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2007, at 
3 (U.S. Census Bureau 2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2009 
pubs/p20-560.pdf.  Lawyers tend to be powerful and influential.  (Is it just a coinci-
dence that every Democratic nominee for President or Vice President since 1984 has 
had a law degree?)   
 21. See, e.g., Linda S. Parks, No Reform is Needed, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Feb. 2008, 
at 4 (‘“Lawyers, because of their professional expertise and interest in the judiciary, 
are well suited to recognize which candidates for judgeship are especially knowledge-
able and skilled lawyers.’  That’s exactly why lawyers serve on the [Judicial Nomi-
nating] Commission.  If you have a serious medical condition, you don’t turn to a 
neighbor or a politician to find a specialist.”) (quoting Ware, supra note 2, at 396). 
 22. Among the definitions of “elite” is “the best of a class.”  Merriam-Webster 
OnLine Dictionary: Elite, supra note 20, § 1.b.  The argument is that lawyers are the 
best (among the class of citizens) at assessing potential judges. 
 23. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(e). 
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The New York Constitution provides that “[t]he governor shall appoint, with 
the advice and consent of the senate, from among those recommended by the 
judicial nominating commission.”24  The judicial nominating commission in 
New York consists of twelve members: four appointed by the governor, four 
by the chief judge of the court of appeals, and four by leaders of the legisla-
ture.25  Of these twelve members, at least four must be members of the New 
York bar.26  This special quota for lawyers is the only one in New York; no 
other occupational group (or other group) is guaranteed representation on the 
state’s judicial nominating commission.27  The “lawyers’ quota” guarantees 
that lawyers, compared to their percentage of the state’s population, will be 
over-represented on the commission.28  As a result, New York gives the 
members of its bar disproportionate power in the selection of the state’s high 
court judges.  In judicial selection, New York gives its lawyers a special 
power not given to other citizens. 
New York is not alone.  Three other states with senate confirmation of 
supreme court justices also (1) require their governors to nominate only 
someone recommended by a nominating commission and (2) give lawyers a 
quota on that commission.29  By introducing these two factors, these states 
make judicial selection less democratic and more elitist than it would other-
wise be.30  In these states (including New York), however, the movement 
from democracy to elitism is relatively small because all members of the 
commission are appointed by popularly elected officials or by judges who 
  
 24. Id. 
 25. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(d)(1). 
 26. Id. (“Of the four members appointed by the governor, no more than two shall 
be enrolled in the same political party, two shall be members of the bar of the state, 
and two shall not be members of the bar of the state.  Of the four members appointed 
by the chief judge of the court of appeals, no more than two shall be enrolled in the 
same political party, two shall be members of the bar of the state, and two shall not be 
members of the bar of the state.”).  No such restrictions are placed on the members 
appointed by leaders of the legislature.  Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. As of the end of calendar year 2008, there were a total of 244,418 registered 
New York attorneys, and, of that total, 153,552 reported an address within New York 
State.  E-mail from Sam Younger, Deputy Director, New York State Office of Court 
Administration, to Professor Stephen J. Ware (Apr. 21, 2009) (on file with author).  
New York State has over nineteen million people.  POPULATION DIVISION, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL ESTIMATES OF THE RESIDENT POPULATION FOR THE UNITED 
STATES, REGIONS, STATES, AND PUERTO RICO: APRIL 1, 2000 TO JULY 1, 2008 (2008),  
http://www.census.gov/popest/states/NST-ann-est.html (follow “Excel” or “CSV” 
hyperlink). 
 29. See Ware, supra note 2, at 388-89 & nn.10-11.  These states are Connecticut, 
Rhode Island and Utah.  Id.  As noted above, Connecticut and Rhode Island require 
confirmation by the entire legislature, not just the senate.  See supra note 10. 
 30. Some states have one, but not the other, of these two factors.  See infra note 
32. 
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have been nominated and confirmed by popularly elected officials.  In other 
words, the populace retains ultimate control over appointments to the judicial 
nominating commission.  The democratic principle of one-person-one-vote is 
followed, albeit indirectly. 
By contrast, two other senate-confirmation states go further down the 
road from democracy to elitism by allowing the bar to select some members 
of the nominating commission.31  In these states, not all of the commissioners 
– who exercise the important governmental power of restricting the gover-
nor’s choice of judicial nominees – are selected under the democratic prin-
ciple of one-person-one-vote.  Rather, some of the commissioners are se-
lected by a small, elite group: the bar.32   
This is really quite startling.  Where else in our federal or state govern-
ments are public officials selected in such an undemocratic way?  Where else 
do members of a particular occupation have, by law, greater power than their 
fellow citizens to select public officials?  When this sort of favoritism for an 
  
 31. See Ware, supra note 2, at 388-89 & nn.10-11.  These states are Hawaii and 
Vermont.  Id. 
 32. More democratic, and less elitist, are states that give lawyers a quota on the 
nominating commission or allow the bar to select some of the commission but do not 
require their governors to nominate someone recommended by the nominating com-
mission.  In these states, the bar’s disproportionate influence over the commission 
may give lawyers greater power than other citizens, but the greater power of lawyers 
is clearly subordinate to the power of the popularly elected governor.  The governor is 
not required to nominate someone recommended by the commission because the 
commission’s existence derives not from the state constitution, but merely from an 
executive order which the governor may rescind.  See Del. Exec. Order No. 4 (Mar. 
27, 2009), available at http://governor.delaware.gov/orders/exec_order_4.shtml 
(commission consists of nine members: eight appointed by governor – four lawyers 
and four nonlawyers – and one appointed by president of bar association, with con-
sent of governor); Me. Exec. Order No. 9 FY 94/95 (Feb. 10, 1995) (five members, all 
appointed by the governor); Mass. Exec. Order 500 (March 13, 2008), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/?pageID=gov3terminal&L=3&L0=Home&L1=Legislation+%2
6+Executive+Orders&L2=Executive+Orders&sid=Agov3&b=terminalcontent&f=Ex
ecutive+Orders_executive_order_500&csid=Agov3 (twenty-one members, all ap-
pointed by governor); Md. Exec. Order No. 01.01.2007.08 (Apr. 27, 2007) available 
at http://www.gov.state.md.us/executiveorders/01.07.08JudicialNominating 
Commissions.pdf (seventeen members, twelve appointed by governor, five by presi-
dent of bar association); N.H. Exec. Order, 2005-2, available at 
http://www.nh.gov/governor/orders/documents/Exec_Order_Judicial_Selection_Com
m2.pdf (eleven members, all appointed by governor, consisting of six lawyers and 
five nonlawyers); N.J. Exec. Order No. 36 (Sept. 22, 2006), available at  
http://www.state.nj.us/infobank/circular/eojsc36.htm (seven members, all appointed 
by governor, including five retired judges).  Also, California probably belongs in this 
category of states that do not require their governors to nominate someone recom-
mended by the commission.  See Ware, supra note 2, at 388-89 nn.10 & 12.   
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occupational group other than lawyers has been attempted, it has, in at least 
one instance, been found unconstitutional.33 
C.  The Most Elitism: The Missouri Plan 
While the states discussed in the previous section have departed from 
the democratic principle of one-person-one-vote (and from the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s model) to give special powers to the bar, they have nevertheless re-
tained senate confirmation of the governor’s nominees for the supreme court.  
In other words, they have introduced an element of elitism to the early part of 
the judicial selection process (whom can the governor pick?), while keeping 
the later part of the process (will the governor’s pick be confirmed?) in the 
hands of democratically elected officials.  By contrast, the third common 
  
 33. See Hellebust v. Brownback, 42 F.3d 1331 (10th Cir. 1994).  In Hellebust, 
the Tenth Circuit found that Kansas’s statutory procedure for electing members to the 
Kansas State Board of Agriculture (Board) violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution.  Id. at 1332.  That Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause requires 
states to follow the principle of “one person, one vote” in most elections.  Id. at 1333 
(citing Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)).  Kansas violated this principle by 
giving the power to elect the Board to delegates from private agricultural associations 
including   
county agricultural societies, each state fair, each county farmer’s insti-
tute, each livestock association having a statewide character, and each of 
the following with at least 100 members: county farm bureau associations, 
county granges, county national farmer’s organizations, and agricultural 
trade associations having a statewide character.   
Id. at 1332 n.1.  As the Tenth Circuit explained, “In the line of cases stemming from 
Reynolds, ‘[t]he consistent theme . . . is that the right to vote in an election is pro-
tected by the United States Constitution against dilution or debasement.’”  Id. at 1333 
(quoting Hadley v. Junior Coll. Dist., 397 U.S. 50, 54 (1970)).  After the Kansas sta-
tute was declared unconstitutional,  
much attention . . . focused on the possibility that agricultural groups 
might be given the power to provide the Governor a list of nominees from 
which the Board must be selected.  Such an option appeared attractive to 
many legislators as a means of preserving the essence of the former sys-
tem.  A similar method of selection is used for various professional organ-
izations and, most prominently, the Kansas Supreme Court.   
Richard E. Levy, Written Testimony of Richard E. Levy Before the House Agriculture 
Committee, State of Kansas, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 265, 282 (1994) (footnotes omitted).  
Professor Levy opines that “this approach might pass equal protection scrutiny on the 
grounds that ‘appointment’ rather than ‘election’ is involved,” because “[m]any cases 
suggest that the ‘one person, one vote’ principle does not apply to appointments.”  Id. 
at 282 & n.118.  However, he notes that “these cases involve appointments by elected 
officials who themselves are chosen in compliance with that principle.”  Id. at 282 
n.118.  As explained below, the core problem of the Missouri Plan is that not all 
members of the nominating commission are appointed by such officials.  See infra 
Part II.A. 
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method of supreme court selection, the “Missouri Plan,”34 has the early-stage 
elitism without the later-stage democracy.35  The Missouri Plan gives dispro-
portionate power to the bar in selecting the nominating commission, while 
eliminating the requirement that the governor’s pick be confirmed by the 
senate or similar popularly elected body.36   
  
 34. The “Missouri Plan” states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, 
Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Nebraska, South Dakota, Tennessee and Wyom-
ing.  See infra note 36.  The “Missouri Plan” was named after the first state to adopt 
it, in 1940.  Unfortunately, some people call this method of selecting judges “merit 
selection.”  See infra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 35. Some readers may wonder if the Missouri Plan’s retention elections provide 
later-stage democracy.  Here, then, we can remind ourselves of the crucial distinction 
between judicial selection and judicial retention.  See supra note 2.  The “later stage” 
discussed here is the later stage of judicial selection.  Judicial retention is a separate 
topic, and retention elections are discussed below.  See infra Part II.C.   
 36. See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, §§ 5, 8 (nominating commission consists of 
seven members: chief justice, three lawyers appointed by governing body of the  
organized bar, three non-lawyers appointed by governor subject to confirmation by 
legislature); ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 36.A (sixteen members: chief justice, five law-
yers nominated by governing body of bar and appointed by governor with advice and 
consent of senate, ten nonlawyers appointed by governor with advice and consent of 
senate); COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 24 (fifteen voting members: eight nonlawyers ap-
pointed by governor, seven lawyers appointed through majority action of governor, 
attorney general and chief justice); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 11(d) (1998);  FLA. STAT. 
ANN. § 43.291.1(a)-(b) (nine members: four lawyers appointed by governor from lists 
of nominees submitted by board of governors of bar association, five other members 
appointed by governor with at least two being lawyers or members of state bar); IND. 
CONST. of 1851, art. VII, §§ 9−10 (1970); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 33-27-2-2, -2-1 (Lex-
isNexis 2007) (seven members: chief justice, three lawyers elected by members of 
bar, three nonlawyers appointed by governor); IOWA CONST. of 1857, art. V, § 16 
(1962); IOWA CODE §§ 46.1−.2, .15 (2006) (fifteen members: chief justice, seven 
lawyers elected by members of bar, seven nonlawyers appointed by governor and 
confirmed by senate); KAN. CONST. art. 3 § 5(e) (nine members: five lawyers elected 
by bar, four nonlawyers appointed by the governor); MO. CONST. of 1945, art. V, § 
25(a)-(d) (1976); MO. SUP. CT. R. 10.03 (seven members: one supreme court judge 
chosen by members of court, three lawyers elected by members of bar, three non-
lawyers appointed by governor); NEB. CONST. of 1875, art. V, § 21 (1972); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-801to 24-812 (LexisNexis 2007) (nine members: chief judge, four 
lawyers elected by members of bar, four nonlawyers appointed by governor); OKLA. 
CONST. art. VII-B, § 3 (thirteen members: six lawyers elected by members of bar, six 
nonlawyers appointed by governor and one nonlawyer elected by other members); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-1A-2 (2007) (seven members: three lawyers appointed by 
president of bar, two circuit judges elected by judicial conference, and two nonlawy-
ers appointed by governor); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-102, -106, -112 (2007) (seven-
teen members: speakers of senate and house each appoint six lawyers, twelve total, 
from lists submitted by Tennessee Bar Association (two), Tennessee Defense Law-
yers Association (one), Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association (three), Tennessee Dis-
trict Attorneys General Conference (three), and Tennessee Association for Criminal 
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The Missouri Plan states’ lack of confirmation by the senate (or other 
popularly elected body) is significant.  In senate-confirmation states, if the 
senate refuses to confirm any of the nominating commission’s first group of 
nominees then the commission must propose one or more additional nomi-
nees to get someone appointed to the court.  By contrast, in Missouri Plan 
states, if the governor refuses to appoint any of the commission’s first group 
of nominees then one of those nominees joins the court anyhow.37  So the 
Missouri Plan gives the commission more power to force one of its favorites 
on the democratically elected officials.  The commission is weaker, relative to 
democratically elected officials, in senate-confirmation states.  Thus, Mis-
souri Plan states are less democratic (and more elitist) than senate-
confirmation states. 
This important distinction between Missouri Plan states and senate-
confirmation states is obscured when all judicial selection methods are re-
duced to two types: elective and appointive.  In fact, the choice is not just 
between electing judges and appointing them.  As this article has shown, 
many appointive systems exist, and they vary widely in the extent to which 
they depart from democratic principles to give special powers to the bar.  
Clarity requires distinguishing Missouri Plan states from senate-confirmation 
states.  Unfortunately, prominent bar groups use the term “merit selection” to 
describe all of these states, so long as they use a nominating commission of 
  
Defense Lawyers (three); the speakers also each appoint one lawyer not nominated by 
an organization and each appoint one nonlawyer and jointly appoint a third nonlawy-
er);  WYO. CONST. art. V, § 4; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-102 (2007) (seven members: 
chief justice, three lawyers elected by members of bar, three nonlawyers appointed by 
governor).    
 37. See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a) (“If the governor fails to appoint any of the 
nominees within sixty days after the list of nominees is submitted, the nonpartisan judicial 
commission making the nomination shall appoint one of the nominees to fill the vacan-
cy.”); KAN. CONST. art. 3 § 5(b) (“In event of the failure of the governor to make the ap-
pointment within sixty days from the time the names of the nominees are submitted to him, 
the chief justice of the supreme court shall make the appointment from such nominees.”); 
OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, § 4 (“The Governor shall appoint one (1) of the nominees to fill 
the vacancy, but if he fails to do so within sixty (60) days the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court shall appoint one (1) of the nominees.”). 
 The importance of this power was demonstrated in Missouri where the governor 
publicly considered the possibility of refusing to appoint any of the three nominees sub-
mitted to him by the supreme court nominating commission.  See Editorial, Blunt Trauma, 
WALL ST. J., Sept. 17, 2007, at A16.  The governor ultimately did appoint one of the no-
minees, and his capitulation to the commission has been explained by the fact that if he did 
not appoint one of those three then the commission would exercise its power to appoint 
one of the three.  Id.  By contrast, the commission lacks this power to ensure that one of its 
nominees becomes a justice where appointment requires confirmation by the senate or 
other publicly elected officials.  The body with the power to withhold confirmation has the 
power to send the commission “back to the drawing board” to identify additional nominees 
if none of the original nominees wins confirmation. 
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any sort.38  This term, “merit selection,” is “propagandistic”39 and obscures 
important distinctions among appointive systems.  Accordingly, I suggest that 
people reject the term “merit selection” in favor of the more-neutral “Mis-
  
 38. The leader in this regard seems to be the American Judicature Society (AJS).  
Under the heading “Judicial Selection in the States . . . ‘Initial Selection: Courts of 
Last Resort,’” AJS claims that at the supreme court level, three states select judges by 
gubernatorial appointment, two by legislative appointment, eight by partisan election, 
thirteen by non-partisan election and twenty-five (including the District of Columbia) 
by merit selection.  AM. JUDICATURE SOC’Y, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE STATES: 
APPELLATE AND GENERAL JURISDICTION COURTS 6 (2007), http://www.ajs.org/ 
selection/docs/Judicial%20Selection%20Charts.pdf.  Among the twenty-four states 
AJS claims for “merit selection” are ten states with confirmation by the senate or 
similar popularly elected body: Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, Utah and Vermont.  Id. 
While today AJS conducts a wide variety of programs, the advocacy of 
and education about the merit selection of judges as an alternative to the 
elective system has, since its formation, been the cornerstone of its activi-
ties.  AJS was formed in 1913 with the general progressive mission of im-
proving the ‘efficiency’ of the administration of justice.  
The founders of AJS shared the commonplace Progressive belief that 
the solution to most of the country’s problems lay in more efficient public 
administration.  The Society’s negative attitude toward the election of 
judges, for example, was part of a widespread denigration of partisan poli-
tics.  Progressives tended to view partisanship as productive of inefficien-
cy in governance and to believe that government should be run like a 
business corporation.   
Jona Goldschmidt, Merit Selection: Current Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1994) (footnotes omitted).  In 1928, AJS endorsed a process in 
which nominations presented to the governor would come from a committee of the 
bar.  Id. at 9.   
Then, in 1937, the [American Bar Association] adopted the merit plan.  It 
proposed: 
(a) The filling of vacancies by appointment by the executive or other elec-
tive official or officials, but from a list named by another agency, com-
posed in part of high judicial officers and in part of other citizens, selected 
for the purpose, who hold no other public office. 
(b) If further check upon appointment be desired, such check may be sup-
plied by the requirement of confirmation by the State Senate or other leg-
islative body of appointments made through the dual agency suggested.  
(c) The appointee shall after a period of service be eligible for reappoint-
ment periodically thereafter or go before the people upon his record with 
no opposing candidate, the people voting upon the question, Shall Judge 
Blank be retained in office?  
Id. at 9-10 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 39. See Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial “Merit” 
Selection, 67 ALB. L. REV. 803 (2004) (“Merit selection – purely, so far as I can tell, 
[is] a propagandistic misnomer.”). 
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souri Plan” and that people reserve the term “Missouri Plan” for states that 
lack confirmation by the senate or similar popularly elected body.   
With this terminology established, we can then make a further distinc-
tion, a distinction among Missouri Plan states.  These states can be placed 
into two categories, which I call “soft” Missouri Plan and “hard” Missouri 
Plan.  (See Table 1 infra page 775.)  The four soft Missouri Plan states have a 
lawyers’ quota on the nominating commission, but all members of the com-
mission are selected by a process that includes popularly elected officials.40  
In these states – Arizona, Colorado, Florida and Tennessee – the bar’s role in 
selecting members of the commission is either non-existent or limited to 
“merely suggesting names for . . . the commission and those suggested do not 
become commissioners unless approved by the governor and/or legislature.”41  
So the elitism of the lawyers’ quota on the commission is balanced to some 
extent by the role of popularly elected officials in appointing the commission. 
Even that balance is lacking in the “hard” Missouri Plan states.  These 
nine states go further than any others in maximizing the power of the bar.  
Not only do these states have a lawyers’ quota on the commission, but the 
quota is also a majority of the commission.  Each of these states’ constitutions 
requires that a majority of the commissioners be lawyers or judges.42  More 
importantly, popularly elected officials play no role in selecting which law-
yers fill the lawyers’ quota on the commission.  Instead, the bar selects the 
lawyers on the commission.43  To reiterate, the lawyer-commissioners (who 
  
 40. See COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 24 (commission consists of fifteen voting mem-
bers: seven lawyers appointed through majority action of governor, attorney general, 
and chief justice, eight nonlawyers appointed by governor); ARIZ. CONST. art. VI, § 
36.A (sixteen members: chief justice, five lawyers nominated by governing body of 
bar and appointed by governor with advice and consent of senate, ten nonlawyers 
appointed by governor with advice and consent of senate); FLA. CONST. art. V, § 
11(d) (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 43.291.1(a)-(b) (West 2008) (nine members: four 
lawyers appointed by governor from lists of nominees submitted by board of gover-
nors of bar association, five other members appointed by governor with at least two 
being lawyers or members of state bar); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 17-4-102, -106, -112 
(2007) (seventeen members: speakers of senate and house each appoint six lawyers, 
twelve total, from lists submitted by Tennessee Bar Association (two), Tennessee 
Defense Lawyers Association (one), Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association (three), 
Tennessee District Attorneys General Conference (three), and Tennessee Association 
for Criminal Defense Lawyers (three); the speakers also each appoint one lawyer not 
nominated by an organization, each appoint one nonlawyer, and jointly appoint a third 
nonlawyer).  Tennessee is the “hardest” of the soft Missouri Plan states because popu-
larly elected officials have the least power (relative to the bar) in selecting commis-
sioners. 
 41. Ware, supra note 2, at 388 & n.8.   
 42. These states are Alaska, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, Okla-
homa, South Dakota and Wyoming.  See supra note 36.  
 43. Id.  My state of Kansas is the “hardest” Missouri Plan state of all because it 
gives the bar more power than even the other hard Missouri Plan states.  The Kansas 
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exercise the important governmental power of restricting the governor’s 
choice of judicial nominees) are not selected in accordance with democratic 
  
bar selects five of the nine members of the Kansas Supreme Court Nominating Com-
mission.  Id.  Kansas is the only state that allows the bar to select a majority of “a 
nominating commission that has the power to ensure that one of its initial nominees 
becomes a justice.”  Ware, supra note 2, at 391.  This differs from some other Mis-
souri Plan states, in which bar-selected lawyers, plus a supreme court justice, consti-
tute a majority of the commission.  What is the difference between having a justice on 
the commission and (the Kansas system) having another bar-selected member on the 
commission?  There is some difference because supreme court justices are different 
from other members of the bar.  Even in “hard” Missouri Plan states, to become a 
justice one must be chosen (over other nominees) by the popularly elected governor, 
and to remain a justice one must win a retention election open to all registered voters.  
See ALASKA. CONST. art. IV, § 5 (governor shall fill any vacancy on supreme court 
“by appointing one of two or more persons nominated by the judicial council”); see 
also id. § 6 (justice “subject to approval or rejection . . . at the first general election 
held more than three years after his appointment,” and thereafter every ten years); 
IND. CONST. art. VII, § 10 (governor shall fill vacancy on supreme court “from a list 
of three nominees presented to him by the judicial nominating commission”); see also 
id. § 11 (justice subject to approval or rejection at general election two years after 
appointment, and thereafter every ten years); IOWA CONST. art. V, § 15 (governor fills 
vacancies on the supreme court from list of three nominees submitted by judicial 
nominating commission); see also id. § 17 (justice subject to retention or rejection at 
first judicial election held more than one year after appointment, and thereafter every 
eight years); MO. CONST. art. V, § 25(a) (governor shall fill vacancy in supreme court 
by appointing one of three persons nominated by judicial commission); see also id. §§ 
19, 25(c)(1) (justice subject to approval or rejection at first general election held more 
than twelve months after appointment, and thereafter every twelve years); NEB. 
CONST. art. V, § 21(1) (governor shall fill any vacancy in the supreme court “from a 
list of at least two nominees presented to him by the . . . judicial nominating commis-
sion”); see also id. § 21(3) (justice subject to approval or rejection at next general 
election more than three years from the date of appointment, and thereafter every six 
years); OKLA. CONST. art. VII-B, § 4 (governor shall fill vacancy on supreme court 
with one of three nominees chosen by Judicial Nominating Commission); see also id. 
§ 5 (justice subject to approval or rejection at first general election more than one year 
after appointment, and thereafter every six years); S.D. CONST. art. V, § 7 (governor 
shall fill vacancy on supreme court from list of nominees chosen by the judicial quali-
fications commission); see also id. (justice subject to approval or rejection at “first 
general election following the expiration of three years from the date of his appoint-
ment,” and thereafter every eight years); WYO. CONST. art. 5, § 4(b) (governor shall 
fill vacancy on supreme court from list of three nominees submitted by judicial nomi-
nating commission); see also id. § 4(f), (g) (justice subject to approval or rejection at 
next general election more than one year after his appointment, and thereafter every 
eight years).  So although these factors do not confer upon justices as much democrat-
ic legitimacy as advocates of the Missouri Plan sometimes claim, see infra Part II.C, 
they do confer some degree of democratic legitimacy.  Thus, the states whose nomi-
nating commissions include a justice (rather than another bar-selected commissioner, 
as in Kansas) do have a supreme court selection process with a bit more democratic 
legitimacy than Kansas. 
149
764 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 74   
principles of equality.  These commissioners are not selected by officials 
elected under the democratic principle of one-person-one-vote.  Rather, they 
are selected by a small, elite group: the bar.44  
For this reason, judicial selection under the Missouri Plan lacks demo-
cratic legitimacy. 
II.  THE MISSOURI PLAN’S LACK OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
A.  The Core Problem of the Missouri Plan 
The Missouri Plan’s lack of democratic legitimacy is explained by Pro-
fessor Jeffrey Jackson: 
A commission system [of judicial selection] carries an even greater 
burden to demonstrate legitimacy than other systems, such as elec-
tions or appointments.  Judicial elections, for all of their problems, 
fit well within the democratic system, in that judges are selected 
through a direct vote of the public.  Even appointments, such as 
those in the federal system, have a basis in the democratic process, 
in that the appointments are made by a popularly-elected official 
holding a national or state-wide office, with the choice then con-
firmed by a popularly-elected representative body.  
Commission systems, on the other hand, do not fit so neatly within 
this democratic framework.  While judges in a commission system 
are appointed by a popularly-elected official, the official’s choice 
is not unfettered.  Rather, the choice is made from a pool selected 
by an unelected commission.  Further, although some members of 
the commission are generally appointed by an elected official, oth-
ers are not.  In particular, many commissions have lawyer mem-
bers that gain their seats, either through election by a minority of 
the persons, i.e. lawyers in their area, or through nomination by 
special interest groups.  The composition of nominating commis-
sions thus raises some serious concerns with regard to legitimacy.45 
As Professor Jackson says, contestable elections and senate confirma-
tion (at least of the sort found in the U.S. Constitution) have democratic legi-
  
 44. Mary L. Volcansek, The Effects of Judicial-Selection Reform: What We 
Know and What We Do Not, in THE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM 79, 86-87 (Philip 
L. Dubois ed., 1982) (“Officials of state bar associations have been the first to admit 
that the merit selection system provides them with the most effective means of in-
fluencing the choice of who will serve on the bench.”).  Perhaps they have admitted 
this less readily in recent years as bar control over judicial selection has become more 
controversial. 
 45. Jackson, supra note 16, at 146 (footnotes omitted).   
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timacy.  And even commission systems have democratic legitimacy insofar as 
members of the nominating commission are appointed by popularly elected 
officials.  Democratic principles are violated, however, when members of the 
commission are selected by “a minority of the persons, i.e. lawyers in their 
area.”46  This, of course, is the core of the Missouri Plan – allowing the bar to 
select some of the commission and then declining to offset that bar power 
with confirmation by the senate or other popularly elected body.47  And it is 
this core that deprives the Missouri Plan of democratic legitimacy.   
Professor Jackson continues: 
The idea of mandating lawyer participation in the selection of 
judges is unique to the commission system and also unique in the 
democratic system.  As a result, it requires special justification if it 
is to be considered legitimate.48  
Most of the commission systems in the United States use the state 
bar, either through its board of governors or through direct election 
of its members, to select the lawyer members.  From a legitimacy 
standpoint, this is a questionable system.  Membership in the state 
bar does not have a connection to the democratic function, and 
judges selected through the use of this system are open to charges 
that they are simply tools of the lawyers running the state bar.49  
Moreover, this problem is not entirely solved by placing the final 
selection in the hands of the governor, an elected official, or by 
juxtaposing the non-lawyer members with lay members who are 
appointed through some other process.  Rather, because the gover-
nor’s choices are generally limited to the slate given to her by the 
commission, the system can be perceived as vulnerable to “panel 
stacking,” wherein the commission submits a combination of    
nominees that offers the governor little real choice.  Even if lay 
members are added to the process, there is the problem that a large 
part of the selection system is being delegated to persons who are 
not subject to the democratic process.50 
So the Missouri Plan’s lack of democratic legitimacy is not cured by the 
fact that the governor gets to choose among the commission’s nominees and 
gets to appoint some members of the commission.  The Missouri Plan never-
theless violates basic democratic principles of equality because some mem-
bers of the commission are selected by the bar.  The problem is not that there 
  
 46. Id. 
 47. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text. 
 48. Jackson, supra note 16, at 148. 
 49. Id. at 153 (footnotes omitted). 
 50. Id. at 153-54 (footnote omitted). 
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is a nominating commission nor even so much that lawyers get a quota of 
seats on that commission.  The core problem of the Missouri Plan is how 
those lawyers are selected. 
Professor Jackson rightly concludes that democratic legitimacy 
would appear to favor a reduction in the influence of the state bar 
and its members over the nominating commission because they do 
not fit within the democratic process.  Rather, the more desirable 
system from a legitimacy standpoint would have a greater number 
of the commission’s members selected through means more con-
sistent with the concept of representative government.51 
To ensure the democratic legitimacy of a nominating commission, none 
of its members should be selected by the bar.  All members should be se-
lected by popularly elected officials or by judges nominated and confirmed 
by such officials.  The democratic legitimacy of a nominating commission is 
especially important in Missouri Plan states because these states fail to offset 
the commission’s power with confirmation of judges by the senate or other 
popularly elected body. 
B.  Judges Are Lawmakers, Not Just Technicians 
So what if the Missouri Plan lacks democratic legitimacy?  While the 
politicians in the legislative and executive branches should be democratically 
elected, judges are not supposed to be politicians, are they?  Judges, advo-
cates of the Missouri Plan argue, should be selected on their professional 
merit, not their political popularity.52 
The problem with this view is that it rests on a one-sided view of the 
role of a judge.  It emphasizes the judge’s role as legal technician at the ex-
pense of the judge’s role as lawmaker.  Of course, judging does involve the 
narrow, lawyerly task of applying to the facts of a case the law made by 
someone other than the judge (e.g., a legislature).  But judging also involves 
the exercise of discretion.  Within the bounds of this discretion, the judge 
makes law.   
This point is not new or controversial.  Our common law system – going 
back centuries to England – rests on judge-made law.53  And judges do not 
  
 51. Id. at 154. 
 52. See, e.g., Honorable Jay A. Daugherty, The Missouri Non-Partisan Court 
Plan: A Dinosaur on the Edge of Extinction or a Survivor in a Changing Socio-Legal 
Environment?, 62 MO. L. REV. 315, 318-19 (1997) (“The Plan seeks to improve the 
selection process and promote superior decision making from the bench by emphasiz-
ing professional qualifications rather than political influence.”). 
 53. See, e.g., Maimon Schwarzschild, Keeping It Private, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 
677, 680 (2007) (“For many centuries in England, and well into the twentieth century 
there and in other English-speaking jurisdictions, the law of tort and contract – the 
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always find the law; sometimes they make the law and make it in accord with 
their own political views.  This, of course, is the basic reality exposed by 
Legal Realism nearly a hundred years ago.54  And it is virtually impossible to 
find anybody who disputes it today.  That “we are all realists now” is so thor-
oughly accepted as to be a cliché.55  “It is a commonplace that law is ‘politi-
cal.’”56 
So honesty requires defenders of the Missouri Plan to acknowledge 
frankly that judges are not merely technicians; they are also lawmakers.  Just 
as it is one-sided to denigrate the technical, lawyerly side of judging by 
claiming that judges are simply “politicians in robes,”57 it is also one-sided to 
denigrate the lawmaking side of judging by claiming that the political views 
of a judge are irrelevant to his or her job as a judge.   
  
heart of private law – was mostly judge-made common law, with statutes few and far 
between.  Even today, much of the law of tort is common law, and although contract 
law in the United States is substantially governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, 
the UCC itself is largely a codification or restatement of common law doctrines and 
rules.”); James E. Herget, Unearthing The Origins of a Radical Idea: The Case of 
Legal Indeterminacy, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 59, 64 (1995) (“unlike the continental 
legal tradition, the common law tradition recognized and accepted as authoritative, the 
proposition that judges make law”). 
 54. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 
1870-1960, at 169-212 (1992) (legal realism’s most important legacy was its chal-
lenge to the notion that law has an autonomous role separate from politics); Michael 
C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 274 (1998) (“[T]he program of unmasking law as politics [was] 
central to American Legal Realism . . . .”); Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Te-
nured” Lawyers, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 88 (1998) (“We live in a post-
Legal Realist Age, when most legal commentators take it for granted that law cannot 
be disentangled from politics and that legal judgment is driven by the political beliefs 
of the decisionmaker.”); Frederick Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 883, 886 (2006) (“Now, having for generations bathed in the teachings of 
Holmes and the Realists, we heed their lessons. We no longer deny the creative and 
forward-looking aspect of common law decisionmaking, and we routinely brand those 
who do as ‘formalists.’  It is thus no longer especially controversial to insist that 
common law judges make law.”). 
 55. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurispru-
dence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267 (1997).  
 56. Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1152 
(1985). 
 57. See, e.g., David R. Stras & Ryan W. Scott, Navigating the New Politics of 
Judicial Appointments, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1869, 1871 (2008) (describing “two popu-
lar narratives about the way Supreme Court Justices decide cases: one that treats Jus-
tices as neutral and nonpolitical ‘umpires,’ and another that views Justices as perva-
sively ideological ‘politicians’ in robes.”); Roy A. Schotland, To the Endangered 
Species List, Add: Nonpartisan Judicial Elections, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1397, 
1419 (2003) (referring “to the cynical view that judges are merely ‘Politicians in 
Judges’ Robes’”). 
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Furthermore, the political/lawmaking side of judging is especially im-
portant for state supreme court justices because they are the final word on 
their state constitutions and common law.58  Accordingly, the case for democ-
racy in judicial selection is at its strongest (and the case for elitism at its 
weakest) when the judges in question are supreme court justices because jus-
tices’ lawmaking powers far exceed those of the “professional technicians 
who sit on lower courts.”59  As Professor Paul Carrington explains, so-called 
“merit selection” of judges 
was popular in numerous states in the twentieth century, but in its 
application to courts of last resort it is linked to a vision of judicial 
office that is technocratic and apolitical.  Although there was a 
time in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when 
many American lawyers and some citizens deluded themselves 
with the belief that judges could be trained to be professional tech-
nicians interpreting statutes and constitutions without regard to 
their political consequences, there is virtually no one who thinks 
that today.60 
Similarly, Professor Michael Dimino concludes, 
Public involvement in the staffing of high courts is beneficial from 
a democratic perspective because of the greater discretion and pol-
icy-making authority exercised by high courts.  Lower courts, by 
contrast, are more often bound by settled law, and the judges on 
such courts do not make policy to the extent that other courts do.  
As a result, there is less need for public involvement in the selec-
tion of lower-court judges, and such involvement may well be a 
negative influence if it encourages those judges to depart from the 
application of settled law.61 
  
 58. Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 784 (2002) (“Not only do 
state-court judges possess the power to ‘make’ common law, but they have the im-
mense power to shape the States’ constitutions as well.”). 
 59. Paul D. Carrington & Adam R. Long, The Independence and Democratic 
Accountability of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 455, 469 (2002). 
 60. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
 61. Dimino, supra note 2, at 451-52.  See also Nagle, supra note 3 at 511 (“Per-
haps, then, different judges should be chosen in different ways.  Judges who decide 
cases that lack interest to the People could be chosen by simple executive appoint-
ment or merit selection; judges who rule on the most controversial questions affecting 
social policy could be elected or appointed by the executive with legislative confirma-
tion designed to probe judicial philosophy.”); G. Alan Tarr, Designing an Appointive 
System: The Key Issues, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 291, 299 & n.42 (2007) (“In most 
civil law countries in Europe, the judiciary is a career service, akin to the American 
civil service system. . . . Competitive examinations are used to banish political con-
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So the case for democracy is strongest (and the case for elitism weakest) 
with respect to supreme court justices because the political/lawmaking side of 
judging is especially important at the supreme court level.   
For this reason, the Missouri Plan should not be used to select a state’s 
highest court.  In Missouri Plan states, the nominating commission is crucial, 
and, in selecting that commission, a member of the bar has more power than a 
fellow citizen who is not a lawyer.  This elitism of the Missouri Plan may be 
somewhat defensible in the context of trial courts.  But at the supreme court 
level, the Missouri Plan’s unequal power between a member of the bar and 
one of her fellow citizens is not acceptable in a democracy.  With respect to 
judges who have the political power of a state supreme court justice, a system 
that counts a lawyer’s vote significantly more than her neighbor’s vote simply 
lacks democratic legitimacy. 
C.  Retention Elections and Democratic Legitimacy 
When confronted with the Missouri Plan’s lack of democratic legitima-
cy, lawyers defending this elitist selection system often assert that it is offset 
by the popular elections used to retain sitting judges.62  In other words, advo-
  
siderations and personal favoritism from the selection process . . . . Yet even these 
countries use an overtly political process in selecting the members of their constitu-
tional courts.”).  While research has not revealed anyone contending that high court 
judges have less policymaking discretion than lower court judges, some people do 
minimize the policymaking discretion of judges generally.  See Bert Brandenburg & 
Roy A. Schotland, Justice in Peril: The Endangered Balance Between Impartial 
Courts and Judicial Election Campaigns, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1229, 1233 (2008) 
(“‘Judges, except in a very limited sense, do not establish policy.’” (quoting James G. 
Exum, Judicial Selection in North Carolina, 35 N.C. ST. B.Q. 4, 8 (1988))).  Howev-
er, one of these authors, Bert Brandenburg, wrote elsewhere: 
America’s courts are under fire.  At both the federal and state levels, the 
influence of tort “reformers” and other special interests threatens the 
courts’ independence.  Groups like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and 
the American Tort Reform Association are targeting the judges who 
uphold our laws and protect our rights.  
Bert Brandenburg, Keep the Courts Free and Fair, TRIAL, July 2004, at 32, 32.  Are 
these two views endorsed by Brandenburg consistent?  If judges “do not establish 
policy” in, say, the common-law field of torts, then why are these interest groups 
“targeting” them? 
 62. See, e.g., Daugherty, supra note 52, at 319 (“advocates maintain that the 
merit selection process provides the following benefits: . . . judges are removed from 
politics, emphasizing professional qualifications rather than political influence . . . 
retention elections provide for democratic participation”); Robert C. Casad, A Com-
ment on “Selection to the Kansas Supreme Court,” 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 424, 
427 (2008) (“In Kansas, our judges have fixed terms of office.  The judges of the 
supreme court and courts of appeals must face retention elections periodically.  Their 
‘accountability’ is thus publicly tested directly before the people.  Since we cannot 
provide the kind of independence protections that federal judges enjoy, we have to 
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cates of the Missouri Plan portray it as a mix of elitism (which they would 
call “professional merit”) at the initial selection stage and democratic legiti-
macy at the retention stage.63  This argument, however, vastly overstates the 
degree of democratic legitimacy provided by retention elections.  In fact, 
retention elections are largely toothless and thus rarely provide significant 
democratic legitimacy. 
The retention elections used in Missouri Plan states are unusual in that 
the sitting judge does not face an opposing candidate; instead, the voters 
choose simply to retain or reject that particular judge.64  For this and other 
reasons, retention elections are nearly always rubber stamps. 
Data on retention elections around the country (as summarized by Pro-
fessor Brian Fitzpatrick) indicate that sitting judges win retention 98.9% of 
the time,65 while – in stark contrast – incumbent supreme court justices run-
ning for reelection in states that use partisan elections win only 78% of the 
time.66  This rubber-stamp aspect of retention elections is intentional.  As 
Professor Charles Geyh puts it, “[I]t is somewhat disingenuous to say that 
merit selection systems preserve the right to vote.  Retention elections are 
designed to minimize the risk of non-retention, by stripping elections of fea-
tures that might inspire voters to become interested enough to oust incum-
bents.”67  Professor Michael Dimino explains:  
[R]etention elections protect incumbency in multiple, related ways: 
They minimize the incentives for opposing forces to wage antire-
tention campaigns by preventing any individual from opposing the 
incumbent directly; they eliminate indications of partisanship that 
allow voters to translate their policy preferences cost-effectively 
into votes; and they increase voter fears of uncertainty by forcing a 
choice of retaining or rejecting the incumbent before the voter 
knows the names of potential replacements.68 
  
take steps to provide some measure of independence from partisan politics at the 
nomination level.”). 
 63. See sources cited supra note 62.   
 64. See supra note 43.  See also Ware, supra note 2, at 407. 
 65. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Election as Appointment: The Tennessee Plan Re-
considered, 75 TENN. L. REV. 473, 495 (2008) (“Even that incredibly high number is 
misleading, however, because over half of the defeats were from Illinois, a state that 
requires judges to win 60% of the vote rather than a mere majority (as do Tennessee 
and most other states) in order to stay on the bench.  Removing the Illinois defeats 
from the data where the judges won more than 50% but less than 60% of the vote 
yields a retention rate of 99.5%.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 66. Id. at 496 & n.192. 
 67. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 55 
(2003). 
 68. Dimino, supra note 39, at 807-08.   
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Dimino concludes that “retention elections seek to have the benefit of 
appearing to involve the public, but in actuality function as a way of blessing 
the appointed judge with a false aura of electoral legitimacy.”69  In other 
words, retention elections are something of a fraud.70  They create a false 
veneer of democracy at the judicial retention stage that the bar can use to 
distract the populace from the elitism of bar power at the initial selection 
stage, which is where the real action is.71 
That said, retention elections are not always toothless.  On rare occa-
sions, a judge loses one.  So retention elections do provide some (however 
small) measure of democratic legitimacy.  Unfortunately, they do this at the 
judicial retention stage, when it does the most harm to judicial independence.  
A wide array of scholars and other commentators agree that “the primary 
threat to [judicial] independence arises at the point of re-selection, when 
judges are put at risk of losing their jobs for unpopular decisions that they 
previously made.”72  This problem is especially acute when a few of the 
judge’s decisions, although well-reasoned in a technical, lawyerly sense, are 
easy to caricature in a “sound bite” television ad.73  Accordingly, as Professor 
Dimino says,  
  
 69. Id. at 811.  
 70. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 65, at 495 (“[T]he architects of merit selection 
came up with what some scholars have concluded was a ‘sop’ to the public: the reten-
tion referendum.  That is, the retention referendum was designed to make the public 
feel as though they had a role in selecting their judges but make it unlikely they would 
exercise that role by voting a judge off the bench.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 71. For example, an op-ed by former Kansas Bar Association President Linda 
Parks refers to my mention of the federal system of judicial selection and retention as 
follows: “Ware mentions the option of changing the system by taking the retention 
vote away from the citizens and instead giving the power to decide the qualifications 
of the justices to politicians.  More power to politicians?  That’s not what most Kan-
sas citizens support.”  Linda Parks, Op-Ed, Keep Selecting Justices on Merit, Not 
Politics, THE WICHITA EAGLE, Dec. 6, 2007, at 7A.   
 72. See Geyh, supra note 2, at 1276. 
 73. See Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study 
of Arbitration Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 650 (1999) (“[In retention elec-
tions,] voters have removed from the bench several judges after high-profile cam-
paigns focusing on the judge’s votes on a single issue, often the death penalty.”);  
Shepherd, supra note 2, at 644 (citing examples); Jackson, supra note 16, at 133-34 
(“Justice White’s experience shows a danger of the commission system that should be 
addressed: the possibility that one decision, because of unfortunate timing or a highly 
coordinated special interest attack, could cause a judge to lose her position.”); Roy A. 
Schotland, New Challenges to States’ Judicial Selection, 95 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1099 
(2007) (“California’s Justice Kaus memorably described the dilemma of deciding 
controversial cases while facing a retention election, comparing it to ‘finding a croco-
dile in your bathtub when you go in to shave in the morning.  You know it’s there, 
and you try not to think about it, but it’s hard to think about much else while you’re 
shaving.’”) (quoting Gerald F. Uelmen, Crocodiles in the Bathtub: Maintaining the 
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[J]udicial terms of office should be long and non-renewable, such 
that there are neither reelections nor reappointments.  Where 
judges know that their ability to stay in office depends on how pol-
iticians or voters view their decisions, there is the potential for de-
cisions to be made on the basis of those political calculations rather 
than on the merits.74   
In sum, retention elections, like other forms of judicial re-selection, do 
not protect judicial independence. 
The Missouri Plan and its retention elections may be the worst of both 
worlds.  While contestable elections threaten judicial independence (especial-
ly at the retention stage),75 contestable elections at least have the virtue of 
conferring significant democratic legitimacy on the judiciary.76  By contrast, 
retention elections also threaten judicial independence but do so without the 
upside of conferring significant democratic legitimacy on the judiciary.  So 
the Missouri Plan initially selects judges in a manner more elitist than demo-
cratic and then brings in a sliver of democratic legitimacy at the retention 
stage, precisely when it does the most harm to judicial independence.  By 
contrast, the best of both worlds can be attained with a more democratic (less 
elitist) method of initially selecting judges followed by terms of office that 
are long and non-renewable.  Such a system avoids the elitism of the Missouri 
Plan while best preserving judicial independence.   
III.  CONCLUSION 
Thoughtful scholars like Professors Carrington and Dimino agree that 
the case for elitism is stronger with respect to the selection of lower-court 
judges than supreme court justices, and, conversely, the case for democratic 
accountability is stronger with respect to the selection of supreme court jus-
tices than lower-court judges.  So far, so good.   
But does democratic accountability of supreme court justices have to 
mean contestable judicial elections?  The arguments against using elections 
for the initial selection of judges are strong.77  The arguments against subject-
  
Independence of State Supreme Courts in an Era of Judicial Politicization, 72 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1133, 1133 (1997)).  
 74. Dimino, supra note 2, at 451. 
 75. Id. at 457. 
 76. Id. at 459-60. 
 77. They begin with the arguments against direct democracy, generally, in favor 
of a system of indirect democracy – such as that adopted by the Framers of the U.S. 
Constitution – in which the structure of government mediates and cools the momenta-
ry passions of popular majorities.  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 49-52 (James Mad-
ison) (Clinton Rossiter ed. 1999) (for Madison’s classic distinction between republics 
and democracies).  The arguments against direct democracy are especially strong with 
respect to the judicial branch because  
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ing sitting judges to any sort of re-election – including the retention elections 
used by the Missouri Plan – are even stronger.78  So we ought to seek a way 
to achieve democratic accountability of supreme court justices without judi-
cial elections.  Fortunately, the U.S. Constitution does exactly that.79  Execu-
tive nomination followed by senate confirmation makes judicial selection 
indirectly accountable to the people without using judicial elections.  And 
giving judges life tenure (or a single, nonrenewable term) preserves this indi-
rect accountability over time without the need for retention (or other) elec-
tions.  
While Professor Carrington concludes that “judicial elections are here to 
stay,”80 and Professor Dimino advocates contestable elections to select (but 
not retain) state supreme court justices,81 I encourage reformers of all stripes 
to reconsider the U.S. Constitution as a model for the selection and retention 
of state supreme court justices.82  A state can select its justices through a se-
  
[j]udicial candidates receive [campaign] money from lawyers and litigants 
appearing in their courts; rarely are there contributions from any other 
source.  Even when the amounts are relatively small, the contributions 
look a little like bribes or shake-downs related to the outcomes of past or 
future lawsuits.  A fundamental difference exists between judicial and leg-
islative offices in this respect because judges decide the rights and duties 
of individuals even when they are making policy; hence any connection 
between a judge and a person appearing in his or her court is a potential 
source of mistrust.   
Carrington, supra note 3, at 91-92.  See also Ware, supra note 2 (“The possibility of 
contributors ‘buying justice’ in individual cases is the primary concern about judicial 
elections.”).  Other concerns about judicial elections include “the reduced perception 
of impartiality caused by statements of judicial candidates on political or social issues, 
the elimination of qualified lawyers who would otherwise be willing to serve as jur-
ists, and the loss of public confidence caused by the vile rhetoric of judicial cam-
paigns.”  Mark A. Behrens & Cary Silverman, The Case for Adopting Appointive 
Judicial Selection Systems for State Court Judges, 11 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
273, 276 (2002).  Each of these concerns is reduced, if not eliminated, by a senate 
confirmation system. 
 78. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text.  
 79. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 80. Carrington, supra note 3, at 107.  Accord Geyh, supra note 67, at 55 (“The 
presence of retention elections in merit selection systems can only be explained as a 
concession to the entrenched political necessity of preserving judicial elections in 
some form, so that merit selection proponents have an answer for detractors who 
oppose plans that ‘take away our right to vote.’”). 
 81. Dimino, supra note 2. 
 82. I am not the first to make this suggestion.  See Carrington, supra note 3, at 
114 (“The best of the various unsatisfactory ways of selecting high court judges is 
probably that prescribed in the Constitution of the United States.”); Tarr, supra note 
61, at 306 (“[I]t is hard to see why only a few states have embraced the federal model.  
The sterling reputation of judges selected for the federal courts, taken as a whole, and 
the national reputations of the California and New Jersey judiciaries indicate that it is 
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nate-confirmation system and thus follow, albeit indirectly, the democratic 
principle of one-person-one-vote.  Several senate-confirmation states even 
use a nominating commission without moving much, if at all, from this dem-
ocratic principle toward elitism.83  These states manage to be democratic 
without being populist.  They are examples for reformers who seek to avoid 
both the populism of contestable judicial elections and the elitism of the Mis-
souri Plan.   
 
 
  
certainly possible to recruit highly qualified jurists using the federal model.  The 
model of a governor-senate appointment process, with or without the participation of 
a nominating commission, deserves serious consideration.”). 
 83. See infra notes 26-29 (New York, Connecticut, Rhode Island, Utah) & 32 
(Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey). 
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